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IBPP previously has commented on the motivation of some Arab nation-states and non-state actors to 
agitate against the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon--the motivation being 
not desiring to give up a political control mechanism over the Israelis that has been useful in 
conceptualizing and managing conflict. However, besides the realpolitik aspects of power relations, 
there are still other rationales for being against the withdrawal. 
 
The Israeli military presence in Southern Lebanon has weakened (if not destroyed) the local rule of law 
(or what passes for a rule of law), a local sense of political autonomy, and supporting local political 
infrastructures. The military presence also has weakened the same assets from a Lebanese national 
objective. A unilateral withdrawal leaves a significant power vacuum that may be filled with malign 
politico-military forces noxious to many Lebanese citizens. The Israelis, then, can be perceived as having 
caused significant injury to a territory and its people and leaving the injury for treatment by others. 
 
There are at least two reasonable counters to this viewpoint. The first suggests that the Israelis occupied 
southern Lebanon to confront a legitimate security threat, that Syria has done something similar in 
Lebanon--if grander in scope--and that the noxious consequences of the Israeli occupation were 
unfortunate side effects. This is indeed the case. However, many legal, moral, and ethical precedents--
e.g., two wrongs don't make a right, an eye shouldn't be taken for an eye--mitigate against the validity 
of this argument. So do operational precedents reinforced by the plain fact that the occupation does not 
seem to have worked (from the Israeli perspective). 
 
The second counter is that the Israelis prefer a multilaterally supported withdrawal, but few other 
nation-states and non-state political actors are willing to provide support. Moreover, even if there were 
more multilateral support, there would still be at least the perception (in many Lebanese citizens' eyes) 
merely of the newest occupation beginning. In addition, one might rightfully posit that Israel is obligated 
to reverse or rectify noxious consequences of its own making. Underneath all of this is yet another 
ethical question: should the victim help the victimizer help the victim, even if the victim and victimizer, 
to a certain extent, may concurrently and spontaneously change roles? 
 
Reasonable analysts can disagree about how to approach the above discourse. But they should agree 
that they should be incredulous in the face of outright incredulity of resistance to the withdrawal of an 
occupying force. (See Daskovsky, D. (1998). The abuser and the abused: Sources of resistance to 
resolving splits in the countertransference in the treatment of adults who were sexually abused as 
children. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 15, 3-13; Fanjoux-Cohen, L., Mouly-Bandini, A., Werner, P. D. , & 
Green, R. -J. (1998). Rethinking marital enmeshment: Distinguishing intrusiveness from closeness-
caregiving among French couples. European Psychiatry, 13, 46-51; Langan, R. (1999). Coming to be: 
Change by affiliation. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 35, 67-80; Ledgerwood, D. M. (1999). Suicide and 
attachment: Fear of abandonment and isolation from a developmental perspective. Journal of 
Contemporary Psychotherapy, 29, 65-73; Syria, Lebanon, and Israel: Is There a Psychologic al Difference 
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Between The Abusive and the Abused? (March 31, 2000). IBPP, 8(12).) (Keywords: Israel, Lebanon, 
Security.) 
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